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EDITORIAL
With the publication of this number, the Review attains the
ripe old age of two years. Though, thus far, it can lay no claim
to that peculiar prestige which is the exclusive attribute of
antiquity of origin, it has at least found a solid place among its
more venerable fellows in the world of law periodicals.
It has striven to be a medium of expression for legal thought,
and its efforts toward the attainment of that end have met with
a cordial recognition which is most gratifying and encouraging.
Through the kind interest and assistance of the Bench and
Bar of Wisconsin and other states, the Review has been able to
present to its readers many useful and valuable discourses upon
various phases of general and local law. For this privilege it is
deeply indebted to its contributors, to whom it is sincerely
grateful.
The columns of the Review are always open to discussions
on suitable subjects, and it is earnestly hoped that they will be
freely utilized for that purpose by those who are in a position
to do so.
CONCEALMENTS, REPRESENTATIONS AND
WARRANTIES AS AFFECTING CON-
TRACTS OF INSURANCE
By ORLAv ANDERSON, OV THE MILWAUKuE BAR.
The scope of this article is confined to concealments, represen-
tations and warranties, eliminating entirely the effect of waiver
and estoppel, and limited to a discussion of the law as it is in
Wisconsin. The subject must naturally be divided into two
periods. (i) The period during which our court gave effect to
the common law on the subject in the absence of any legislative
enactment.' (2) The period following the enactment of legis-
lation on the subject.'
THE COMMON LAW ON THE SUBJECT IN
WISCONSIN.
Prior to legislative interference, the decisions of our courts
would seem to settle the rule in this state that a concealment in
order to avoid the policy must be (i) material to the risk, and
(2) such concealment must aniount to bad faith on the part of
the assured or not be responsive to inquiries made upon the sub-
ject. The foregoing states the early rule in all branches of
insurance except marine insurance.3 For the very obvious reason
that marine insurance is inherently different in its nature and the
facts surrounding the risk are more completely in the possession
of the assured, in fact, the assured is often the only person who
has any knowledge of the facts, he therefore is obligated to dis-
close every material fact pertaining to the risk of which he is
charged with knowledge, and this is true even though the failure
to disclose the material fact was the result of mistake or inad-
vertence and not due to fraud.'
i. Section XIII, Article XIV, Wisconsin Constitution.
2. Section i941-45, Sec. I94r-x, Sec. 4202-M, Wisconsin Statutes.
3. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. Mechanics Savings Bank & Trust
Co., 72 Fed. 414, 38 L. R. A. 33; Wright vs. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 36
Wis. 522; Campbell vs. American Fire Ins. Co., 73 Wis. Ioo; Van.Kirk
vs. Citizen's Ins. Co., 79 Wis. 627; Johnson vs. Scottish Union and Na-
tional Ins. Co., 93 Wis. 223.
4. Burritt vs. Insurance Co., 5 Hill (N. Y.) 188, 40 Am. Dec. 345.
"In marine insurance the misrepresentation or concealment by the assured
of a fact material to the risk will avoid the policy, although no fraud was
intended. It is no answer for the assured to say that the error or sup-
pression was the result of a mistake, accident, forgetfulness or inad-
vertence. It is enough that the insurer has been misled and has thus
been induced to enter into a contract, which upon correct and full infor-
mation, he would either have declined or would have made upon different
terms. Although no fraud was intended by the assured, it is nevertheless
a fraud upon the underwriter, and avoids the policy."
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In the case of Alkan vs. The New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co.,
53 Wis. 136, it was held that tie assured was not bound to volun-
teer information concerning the incumbrance nor to disclose the
existence of an oral executory contract to lease the premises. It
did not appear that the assured made a written application. How-
ever, the policy provided that the omission "to make known a
material fact representing the condition, situation, value or
occupancy of the property" would invalidate the contract. This
language was held to relate more particularly to the physical
status of the property rather than to incumbrance. Where the
assured warranted that he was the owner of certain lands by
warranty deed and failed to disclose that he held a portion of it
by parol trust, it was held that the answers were responsive,
sufficient and true, that no information concerning outstanding
equities was called for. The assured, therefore, was not bound
to volunteer any.' Notwithstanding, a provision that the policy
shall be void if any fact material to the risk is concealed by the
assured, and a policy issued without any written application by
the assured and without any question being put to him as to mat-
ters material to the risk, will not be invalidated by the failure of
the assured to disclose such material facts, if he did not inten-
tionally or fraudulently conceal them.'
In England no distinction is made between marine and other
branches of insurance, the strict rule requiring a full disclosure
of material facts being enforced in all branches. The following
is from Carter vs. Boehrn, 3 Burroughs 19o5, and expresses the
English rule:
"The special facts upon which the contingent chance is
to be computed lie most commonly in the knowledge of the
insured only. The underwriter trusts to his representation
and proceeds upon confidence that he does not keep back
any circumstance in his knowledge to mislead the under-
writer into a belief that the circumstance does not exist, and
to induce him to estimate the risk as if it did not exist.
The keeping back of such circumstance is a fraud and,
therefore, the policy is void. Although the suppression
should be through mistake, without any fraudulent inten-
tion, yet still the underwriter is deceived and the policy is
void, because the risk run is really different from the risk
understood and intended to be run at the time of the agree-
ment."
5. Pavey vs. American Ins. Co., 56 Wis. 221.
6. Van Kirk vs. Citizen's Ins. Co., 79 Wis. 627, 48 N. W. 798.
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In 1895 the Wisconsin legislature enacted Section i941-45
and required this section to be incorporated into fire insurance
policies thereby adopting the English rule as laid down in Carter
vs. Boehm, supra, as to fire insurance as well as marine insurance.
In 1917 this section was slightly modified and re-enacted as
194I-X. This modification of the law makes a policy voidable at
the option of the insurer if the assured conceals a material fact
and he cannot be heard to say that the concealment was due to
inadvertence or mistake.'
REPRESENTATIONS.
A representation precedes and induces the policy and is no
part of it. It contains the information upon which the insurer
accepts or rejects the risk and fixes the rate; it is the basis of
the contract and must be substantially true.
Until the passage of Section 42o2-m R. S. Wis., a material
false representation would render an insurance contract voidable.
In the case of Peterson vs. Independent Order of Foresters, 162
Wis. 562, the assured represented that he had suffered no injury
and had had no medical attendance within five years and the
court said, "The representations made by the assured in his appli-
cation to the effect that he had suffered no injury and had no
medical attendance within five years, were not only warranties
but they were necessarily material to the risk. They are shown
by the proof of death to have been not only nominally but sub-
stantially false, and this fact avoids the policy." It was held that
Section 42o2-m did not apply, the defendant being a fraternal
benefit society and Section 1956 R. S., sub-section 9, provides
that express reference must be made to a fraternal benefit society
in order to make the law applicable to it. Section 42o2-m pro-
vides that in order to avoid the contract the representation must
not only be material and false but must be made with actual
7. Section i941-45 R. S. Wis., Sec. ig4i-x R. S. Wis.
Sec. i941-45: "This entire policy shall be void if the insured has con-
cealed or misrepresented, in writing- or otherwise, any material fact or
circumstance concerning this insurance or the subject thereof; or if the
interest of the insured in the property be not truly stated herein, or in
case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured touching any matter
relating to this insurance or the subject thereof, whether before or after
loss."
Sec. 1941-x: "This entire policy shall be void if the insured has con-
cealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance concerning
this insurance or the subject thereof; or in case of. any fraud or false
swearing by the insured touching any matter relating to this insurance or
the subject thereof, whether before or after loss."
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intent to deceive. There are American cases holding that a
fraudulent representation of an immaterial fact will avoid the
policy, but this is not the law. The true rule, except as the same
has been modified by statute, is expressed in the case of Vivar vs.
Supreme Lodge, 52 N. J. Law 455, 20 AtI. 836, as follows:
"If the representation made, though known by the in-
sured to be false, did not differ from the truth in any respect
which was, either in fact or in the view of the insurer, ma-
terial to the contract, then the falsehood did not mislead the
insurer or induce the contract, and should not be allowed
to avoid it. Usually the materiality of a representation will
be inferred from the fact that it was made pending the
negotiations, in response to a specific inquiry by the insurer;
but this rule is not universal, for the purpose of the inquiry
must be considered, to see whether the information is sought
to aid the insurer in fixing the terms on which he will con-
tract, or with an entirely different object. Thus, if a mutual
insurance company should require its premiums to be paid
within a definite time after the mailing of notice addressed
to the residence of the insured, and, with this rule in view,
should require every applicant for insurance to state his
residence in his application, and an applicant should give
as his residence not the truth, but the place where he ordi-
narily received his mail, it would seem absurd to hold that
such circumstance would invalidate the contract."
It has been held in Wisconsin that false representations as to
incumbrance and upon the unprofitableness of the property
insured are material to the risk and avoid the policy if they are
relied upon,' and a gross understatement by the applicant of the
amount of incumbrance on the property, rendered the policy
void.'
In 19o9 the Wisconsin legislature enacted Section 42o2-m and
in 1917 broadened the scope of the section making it applicable
to fraternal or mutual benefit societies' This section has been
8. Ryan vs. Springfield ]Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 46 Wis. 671, I. N.
W. 426.
9. O'Brien vs. The Home Ins. Co., 79 Wis. 399, 48 N. W. 714.
io. Section 42o2-m: "No oral or written statement, representation or
warranty made by the insured or in his behalf in the negotiation of a
contract of insurance shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the
policy, or prevent its attaching unless, such statement, representation or
warranty was false and made with actual intent to deceive or unless the
matter misrepresented or made a warranty, increased the risk or con-
tributed to the loss.
"No warranty incorporated in a contract of insurance relating to any
fact prior to a loss shall defeat or avoid such policy unless the breach of
such warranty increased the risk at the time of the loss, or contributed to
the loss, or unless such breach existed at the time of the loss.
"The provisions of this section shall apply to fraternal or mutual bene-
fit societies."
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held to apply in case of a bond to indemnify an employer for loss
through the dishonesty of an employee or an agent, such a bond
being held "a contract of insurance" within the meaning of this
section. It was also held that an untrue statement by the
employer in his application will not invalidate the bond even
though denominated a warranty, where other language showed
that an honest statement to the best of his ability was what he
was required to make; it further appearing that the surety com-
pany did not rely upon the statement, but rather upon the re-
port of its own agent."
Some confusion has been caused by the term "promissory
representations" found in many of the books. What is really
meant is not a representation but a promise to do, or not to do
a certain thing, and a failure to comply with such a promise can-
not be shown by parol unless the purpose is to show that the
person making the promise made it fraudulently, to induce the
contract and without any intention on his part to fulfill it; as
for example, where the owner represented that the vessel insured
would carry a moderate amount of freight. It would not be
permissible to show that it carried a heavy cargo and in conse-
quence was lost, except for the purpose of showing that the
misrepresentation was fraudulent and that the ow*ner made it to
induce the contract, without any intention of keeping the promise.
WARRANTIES.
Warranties consist of representations, agreements and prom-
ises made a part of the policy, and appearing upon the face of
it or upon some paper attached to it; as for example, the appli-
cation. 2 They are vital parts of the contract and must be strictly
complied with as they are in the nature of conditions precedent.
Warranties are of two kinds, viz., affirmative and promissory.
An affirmative warranty is an agreement contained in the
policy that certain facts relating to a risk are true, or that cer-
tain acts have been or will be performed.
Where the application was made a warranty and failed to
disclose the condition of the title of the property insured and
there was a provision that the policy hould be void in case of
erroneous representations or omissions of material facts, and the
assured represented in the application that he held the property
ii. Whinfield vs. Mass. Bon. & Ins. Co., 162 Wis. I, 154 N. W. 632.
12. Rednan vs. The Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 89, I N. W. 393.
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by contract and his only title vas by virtue of a contract for sale
and purchase entered into several years before it appeared that
he was far in arrears on his payments, and the contract further
provided that he was to hold the land as a tenant by sufferance,
subject to be removed as a tenant holding over whenever default
should be made in any of the payments, and that the agreement
should be utterly void and all payments forfeited in case of
-failure to make timely payments and that it appeared that the
assured had paid only two hundred dollars of the purchase money
and was in default of the remainder with interest, it was held
that such misrepresentations "rendered the policy void."' 8
PROMISSORY WARRANTIES.
A promissory warranty is a promise that a certain thing will
or will not be done after the policy is in force, also that certain
facts or conditions pertaining to the risk shall not change, it can
only relate to matter subsequent. The presumption is that war-
ranties are affirmative unless the contrary is clearly established.
'The line of demarcation between affirmative and promissory
warranties is not difficult to locate if one bears in mind that an
affirmative warranty pertains to existing facts and that a promis-
sory warranty contemplates the future. For example, the appli-
cant for insurance stated, "clerk sleeps in store." This was not a
promissory warranty but an affirmative warranty pertaining to
an existing fact, not a promise that the clerk would continue to
sleep in the store. 4
The words "no regular watchman, but one or two hands sleep
in the mill" is an express warranty that one or two employes do
sleep there each night and an undertaking that they shall con-
tinue to do so.' To avoid the policy for a breach of a promis-
sory or continuing statement or undertaking, true when made
but afterwards departed from, the assured must show the change
increased the risk or hazard of loss. Where there was a war-
ranty to use only lard and sperm oil for lubricating and to keep
a force pump on the premises and a proper supply of good hose,
it was held that these were promissory warranties, and not of
conditions subsequent.' Although the application provided that
13. Hinman vs. The Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 159.
14. Hosford vs. Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 399, 32 L. E. D., 1916.
15. Blumer vs. Phoenix Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 622, S. C. 48 Wis. 535, 4 N.
W. 674.
16. Redinan vs. The Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 89, Y N. W. 393;
Copp vs. The German American Ins. Co., 51 Wis. 637, 8 N. W. 127.
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an inventory be taken once a year, the contract was not breached
because the assured permitted sixteen months to elapse before
taking an inventory.'
As in the case of representations, Section 4o2-m'has like-
wise changed the rule pertaining to warranties and it is now
necessary, in order to avoid the policy, to show that the warranty
was not only false but that it was made with intent to deceive.
On account of legislative enactments herein pointed out, it
is perceived that there is a wide distinction in the law of con-
cealments and representations as applied to fire insurance policies
and the other branches of insurance, but the law applicable to
warranties, as provided by Section 42o2-m, seems to apply with
equal force to all branches of insurance.
17. Newton vs. Theresa Village Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 Wis. 289, l04
N. W. io7.
TAX TITLES UPON WHICH THE THREE-YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
HAS RUN
By K. K. KI NNAN, OF TH4 MiLWAUKEE BAR.
EnIToR's NoTE: -This is the second of two articles on tax titles by
Mr. Kennan. The first, dealing with TAX TITLES UPON WHICH THE
THREE-YEAR STATUTE HAS NOT RUN, appeared in the April
number of the Review.
Having examined some of the technical defects which can be
utilized to set aside a tax deed before the three-years' statute has
run in its favor, we shall now consider some of the points which
can be raised to set aside a tax deed after the statute has run, or
appears to have run, in its favor.
The three-years' statute of limitations, as against the former
owner, will be found in Section x i88 of the Revised Statutes, and
reads as follows:
"No action shall be maintained by the former owner or any
person claiming under him to recover the possession of any land
or any interest therein which shall have been conveyed by deed
for the non-payment of taxes or to avoid such deed against any
person claiming under such deed unless such action shall be
brought within three years next after the recording of such deed.
Whenever any such action shall be commenced upon a tax deed
heretofore or hereafter issued after the expiration of three years
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